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Robinette v. Helvering: Valuation of Gifts
to Split-Interest Trusts
Stephanie E. Heilborn* and Cindy Zhou**
Robinette v. Helvering1 was decided in tandem with Smith v.
Shaughnessy2 on February 15, 1943. Together, these cases provide the
legal basis for the gift taxation of interests in split-interest trusts and,
most important, for the valuation rules of Code section 2702.
To understand Robinette, one must first take a look at its companion case. Smith was decided first and had a simpler fact pattern. The
petitioner, Mr. Smith, made a gift to an irrevocable trust, with income
payable to his wife for life. Upon his wife’s death, the trust principal
would revert to the petitioner, if he was then living, or if not, it would go
to such persons as his wife may appoint by will, or in default of such
appointment, to her intestate successors under applicable New York
law. The Court reasoned that there were three interests involved in the
case: the life estate, the remainder, and the reversion.3 There was no
dispute that the transfer of the life estate was a completed gift. The
reversionary interest to the donor, in the event he outlived his wife, was
an interest having value which could be calculated actuarially. The
Court determined that the reversionary interest was not a completed
gift on the grounds that the donor had retained economic control over
such interest, but held that the remainder interest was a completed gift
because the grantor had neither the form nor the substance of control
and never would have unless he outlived his wife.4 The Court further
held that the complexity of a property interest created by a trust cannot
serve to defeat a tax, especially when the complexity is purposely created by the grantor of the trust.5
The Court rejected the argument that because the value of the remainder would be includible in the grantor’s gross estate for estate tax
purposes, the same property would thus be taxed twice, first as a gift and
* A.B. Harvard University; M.Sc. London School of Economics; J.D. Georgetown
University Law Center. Partner, Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP. ACTEC Fellow.
** B.A. Fudan University; J.D. Columbia Law School; LL.M. in Taxation, New York
University School of Law. Associate, Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP.
1 318 U.S. 184 (1943).
2 318 U.S. 176 (1943).
3 Id. at 177-78.
4 Id. at 181.
5 Id. at 180.
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second as an asset of the estate. The Court reasoned that the gift tax
amounts to a security deposit or down payment that secures the eventual payment of the estate tax, and that double inclusion does not equal
double taxation.6 Thus, Smith stands for the proposition that a remainder interest, even though it may be a completed gift, can be subject both
to gift tax (as a completed gift) and estate tax (as a reversion).7 However, Smith did not answer the question of how to value such a remainder interest for gift tax purposes.
Robinette involved a more complicated trust arrangement that
forced the Court to address the valuation of split interests. The petitioners, Ms. Robinson, and her mother, Mrs. Robinette, each created a trust,
reserving a life estate in the income to herself, and then creating a second life estate in the income interest for each other. Both assigned the
remainder interest to Ms. Robinson’s issue upon the issue’s reaching the
age of twenty-one. Ms. Robinson did not yet have any issue at the time
of the gifts.8
The parties acknowledged that the transfers of the secondary life
income interests constituted taxable gifts. The issue was whether the
petitioners had made a taxable gift of the remainder interests.9 The petitioners argued that they had not relinquished economic control because there were no ascertainable donees in existence at the time of the
gifts.10 The Court relied on its reasoning in Smith and held that the
transfers of the remainder interests were clearly gifts because the property could not be returned to the grantors except for contingencies beyond their control.11
The question remained, though, as to how to value those remainder
interests. The petitioners argued that in computing the value of the remainder interests, they should be allowed a deduction for the value of
the grantor’s reversionary interest, i.e., the possibility that the grantor
would survive Ms. Robinson without her having had issue who had then
reached age twenty-one. The Court distinguished the Smith case, in
which the grantor’s reversionary interest depended solely upon his surviving his wife, a contingency capable of ascertainment by recognized
actuarial methods.12 On the contrary, in Robinette, the grantors’ reversionary interest depended not only on survivorship but also on the death
of the daughter without issue who should reach the age of twenty-one
6
7
8
9
10
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12

Id. at 179.
Id.
Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184, 185-86 (1943).
Id. at 186.
Id.
Id. at 186.
Id. at 188.
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years. The Court did not believe there was any recognized method by
which it would be possible to determine the value of such a contingent
reversionary remainder,13 which necessarily includes considerations of
whether or not the daughter would marry, whether or not she would
have children, and whether or not the children would reach the age of
twenty-one. Therefore, the Court denied any deduction for the reversionary interest, in effect valuing such interest at zero, in the absence of
any convincing evidence to the contrary.14 As a result, the donors had
made a completed gift of the full value of the remainder interest in the
property.15
This result was codified in Treasury Regulation section 25.25111(e), which provides as follows:
If a donor transfers by gift less than his entire interest in property, the gift tax is applicable to the interest transferred. The
tax is applicable, for example, to the transfer of an undivided
half interest in property, or to the transfer of a life estate when
the grantor retains the remainder interest, or vice versa. However, if the donor’s retained interest is not susceptible of measurement on the basis of generally accepted valuation
principles, the gift tax is applicable to the entire value of the
property subject to the gift. Thus if a donor, aged 65 years,
transfers a life estate in property to A, aged 25 years, with remainder to A’s issue, or in default of issue, with reversion to
the donor, the gift tax will normally be applicable to the entire
value of the property.16
The example in the last sentence directly adopts the facts of Robinette.
Until the adoption of Code section 2702 in 1990, though, any accepted actuarial valuation method was valid to carve out retained interests as non-gifts. There was a concern that this allowed the
manipulation of income and remainder interests by donors, such as in
the “grantor retained income trust,” or GRIT, which allowed the donor
a deduction for the actuarial value of the grantor’s retained income interest in a trust but did not preclude the trustee from investing the trust
assets in such a manner to minimize the actual income paid to the grantor (and thereby maximize the value of the remainder interest).
Code section 2702 eliminated this arrangement, so it is no longer
sufficient for a retained interest to be capable of ascertainment by recognized actuarial methods; instead, the grantor’s retained interest must
13
14
15
16

Id.
See id. at 189.
Id. at 186-89.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(e).
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be a “qualified interest”17 in order to be deductible from the value of
the entire interest gifted to the trust. If the retained interest is not a
qualified interest, it will be valued at zero if the transferee is a “member
of the family” of the transferor.18 Although this might have seemed to
be a very restrictive rule in 1990, when the Code section 7520 rate
(which is used to value retained interests under Code section 2702) was
averaging over 10%, in today’s low interest rate environment, a GRAT
is an extremely effective estate-planning technique notwithstanding the
qualified interest requirements.
But from a theoretical perspective, both Robinette and Code section 2702 share a conceptual problem that goes against well-established
rules of gift taxation. Under these constructs, although the apportionment of value in the initial transfer is well settled, the subsequent treatment of a retained interest that has no ascertainable value (or fails the
2702 definition of a qualified interest) is unclear. Arguably, a problem
of double taxation will arise if the retained interest, initially valued at
zero, enters the transfer tax base a second time as a gift, and/or a third
time as an estate. It would seem logical that if the donor subsequently
gives away the retained interest as a lifetime gift, this later gift should be
disregarded, regardless of the value of the interest at the time of the
actual gift (because it was already taxed once). This view may give consistency to the valuation of the retained interest and prevent double taxation; however, this pragmatic approach goes against the generallyaccepted gift tax principle that a gift is only taxable when complete.
There is a gap in timing between when the gift tax is imposed (at the
initial transfer) and when the completed gift is actually made (at the
subsequent transfer).
Similarly, when the subsequent transfer occurs at death (because
the retained interest is includable in the donor’s estate), the value of this
retained interest will be the fair market value at the time of the donor’s
death. This result is required under Code section 2001(b). Between the
initial transfer and the subsequent transfer, the retained interest may
have changed in value significantly. It seems as if the government gets a
second bite at the apple by taxing the same interest once, and then again
(even though double taxation can be abated to a certain extent, but not
completely, as explained below) at a potentially much higher value.
Code section 2001(b) may not work to avoid double taxation in all
circumstances because it only applies to “taxable gifts” that are included
17

I.R.C. § 2702(b).
I.R.C. §§ 2702(a)(2)(A), (e), 2704(c)(2). Note that other arrangements, such as
GRITs, still are perfectly acceptable as long as the transferee is not a member of the
grantor’s family. This has made GRITs useful, for example, for wealth transfers between
same-sex couples who are not married.
18
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in the gross estate.19 It works well when a donor has made a completed
gift of property (and there was a clearly established valuation for that
gift) and then subsequently that property was included in the donor’s
estate because of a string. However, when a donor retains an interest
and the retained interest subsequently is includible in the donor’s estate,
it is difficult to argue that the retained interest is a completed, “taxable
gift.” Even if one can argue that Code section 2001(b) technically applies in these situations, the section 2001(b) adjustment may be unworkable because it consists of an exclusion from adjusted taxable gifts of the
value of the initial taxable gift that is subsequently included in the gross
estate, even though this value could not be ascertained at the time of the
gift, or was by statute valued at zero. It would seem difficult to argue
that the retained interest has an ascertainable value for purposes of section 2001(b) adjustment, or to establish what that value might be, if for
gift tax purposes that retained interest clearly had a value of zero.
Therefore, although the holding in Robinette is defensible from an
administrative perspective, i.e., both donors and the IRS must have to
follow actuarial principles in valuing gifts, the case is problematic because it seems to support the proposition that an interest can be valued
in one manner for gift tax purposes and yet another manner for estate
tax purposes, which should not be the result since the gift tax and the
estate tax are to be construed in pari materia.20
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See I.R.C. § 2001.
Harris v. Comm’r, 340 U.S. 106, 107 (1950).

